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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT B. SWANER, 
Respondent, 
vs. 
UNION MORTGAGE COMPANY, a corpo-
ration, 
A. ppella;nt. 
No. 6234 
Appeal from the Third Judicial District Court of the 
State of Utah in and for Salt Lake City, Utah, Before 
Hon. Herbert M. Schiller. 
RESPOINDENT' s BRIEF 
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IN THE 
SUPREME CiOUR T 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT B. SWANER, 
Respondent, 
vs. 
UNION MORTGAGE· COMPANY, a corpo-
ration, 
Appellant. 
RESPO·NDENT' S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF' THE CASE 
No.~6234 
This action was brought by respondent, Robert B. 
Swaner, against appellant, Union Mortgage Company, 
to compel the cancellation of respondent's promissory. 
note in favor of appellant for th·e sum of $3000; and a 
mortgage .securing said note which covers certain real 
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estate in Salt Lake County, Utah, and to recover dam-
ages under Section 78-3-8 Revised Statutes of Utah 1933. 
On or about the first day of November, 1938, respond-
ent applied to appellant for a loan of $3000, for the pur-
pose of constructing a residence on the property in plain-
tiff's complaint described, located on Sixteenth East 
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah. Appellant agreed to make 
said loan provided it could secure a commitment for in-
surance of the same under the regulations of Federal 
Housing Administration, and said commitment was ob-
tained November 6, 1938 (Exhibit 6), provided respond-
ent's father and mother would sign the paper.s. (Ab. 30-
31, Tr. 105.) 
It is admitted by the pleadings that the note and 
mortgage were executed and delivered to appellant on or 
about November 14, 1938~ and that on or about said date 
said mortgage was recorded in the office of the County 
Recorder ·of Salt Lake County. (Ab. 2, 6; Tr. 19, 30.) 
At the time the note and mortgage were executed it was 
agreed that 10% of said loan would be advanced when the 
foundation was completed and the floor joists set, and the 
work had received F.H.A. inspection; 15% when the roof 
was on; 20% when the house was ready for plastering; 
25% when the house was ready to be decorated; and 30% 
when the structure was co~pleted and had been approved, 
by F.H.A: (Exhibit A.) (Ah. 28, Tr. 85.) 
Respondent proceeded with the work of construction 
and after the founda:tion had been comp~leted an.d the 
floor joists set the F.H.A. made its first inspection, ap-
proved the work (Ab. 28, 32; Tr. 179), and left on the 
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premises its ''Memorandum of Compliance Inspection,'' 
under date of December ~1, 1938, certifying that "the 
work then completed has passed the first inspection.'' 
(Exhibit 3.) 
After the inspection respondent made repeated de-
mands for the 10%, but appellant made excuses for non-
payment, first, that there was something wrong with the 
cement, and later that they had not received the Inspec-
tion Report from F.H.A. (Tr. 113-114.) Respondent then 
went to F.H.A. and was informed that the report had 
been mailed to appellant. Respondent again went to ap-
pellant and a Mr. Chambers, to his apparent surp.rise 
(Tr. 120) finally found the report (Exhibit 1) in the file, 
and stated that he would take it up with Mr. Billings, the 
manager of appellant company. The following d~y when 
respondent called again to see about the 10%, he was in-
formed that app.ellant would not pay the money until 
respondent had complied with certain conditions respect-
ing an entirely different loan covering property on Tenth 
Avenue. (Ab. 32-33; Tr.l16-120.) 
Respondent was obliged to cease work on the building 
because of his inability to pay for materials and labor 
(.Ab. 28-29; Tr. 94-98); and it has at all times since re-
mained in its unfinished condition, as shown by Exhibits 
Band C. 
Upon refusal of appellant to advance any money on 
the loan, as it agreed to do, respondent made written de-
mand on appellant (Exhibit D) for the cancellation and 
return of his note and the release of said mortgage, which 
appellant refused to do unless r_espondent would pay 
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appellant $114.10, alleged costs of procuring the F.H.A. 
commitment for the insurance of said loan. Thereupon 
respondent filed this action. The jury rendered an ad-
visory verdict and the court, adopting said verdict, made 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment, di-
recting the release and cancellation of the note and mort-
gage and awarding respondent damages in the sum of 
$225, and his costs. (Tr. 57-58, 68-69.) This appeal is 
from said judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
It manifestly appears from the evidence that appel-
lant violated its agreement to advance the money it agreed 
to loan respondent. 
On this appeal the technical defense is raised that 
there was no F.H.A. approval of the work so as to en-
title respondent to the 10% payment which became due 
when the foundation was completed and the floor joists 
set. There is no merit to this contention, for the evidence 
is clearly to the contrary. 
Swaner testified on direct examination: 
"Q. Now you testified, Mr. Swaner, when the 
floor of this building was constructed and the joists 
were constructed, I think they are, they were to have 
an F .H.A. inspection~ 
A. Yes. 
Q,. Did it have an F.H.A. inspection? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Was that inspection approved by F.H.A. ~ 
A. Yes, it was passed by F.H.A. at that time.'' 
(Ab. 28, Tr. 91-92.) 
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On re-direct examination he testified: 
'' Q. Mr. g,yaner, I think you testified on cross-
examination that the house had received its first 
F.H.A. inspection~ 
A. That is right. 
Q. No,v, after that time, and that was after the 
floor had been completed an·d joists set-
A. Yes. 
Q. No,v, after that time, did you at any time sub-
sequent to that, have a conversation with defendant 
mortgage c-ompany, or its officers, with respect to 
the advancement of the ten per cent of the original 
loan¥ 
A. Yes. 
Q. With whom did you have that conversation~ 
A. Mr. Frank Conners~ 
Q. And about when did you have it-that is, ap-
proximately, to the best of your recollection"~ 
A. W~ll, approximately the first of December. 
Q. About how long after the F.H.A. inspection 
had been made¥ 
A. Immediately after the F.H.A. inspection, 
the day after or so, I started to ask for the ten per 
cent. 
Q. What was the conversation~ 
A. I told them that it had passed the F.H.A. 
inspection and I wanted my ten per cent. They said 
to begin with that there was something wrong with 
the cement in the foundation, and after that they 
said they had received no notice from F .H . ..~..t\.. 
Q. What was done with reference ·to the ce-
ment after you had had this conversation~ 
A. I called up my cement contractor and told 
him that. 
• • 
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Q. State what was done~ 
A. It was taken care of. 
Q. What do you mean taken care of~ 
A. As I remember they were afraid the cement 
was freezing and they wanted to wait and see. 
MR. SHIELDS: Now if the court please-
A. They-meaning F.H.A. 
Q. Did the F.H.A. afterwards inspect the ce-
ment~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now Mr. Swaner, what did the F.H.A. finally 
do with reference to the cement and flooring~ 
A. The cement and floors~ 
Q. Joists, or whatever it was~ 
A. Why, they were passed." (Tr. 113-116.) 
A. J. Dean, a witness for plaintiff, testified: 
'' Q. Do you know whether or not this structure 
was inspected by the F.H.A. ~ · 
A. I know that it was. 
Q. How do you know that~ 
A. Because when I came there on the job there 
was a ticket fastened to one of the wires on the forms, 
which it said on it-,Vell, it was an F·.H.A. approval 
slip of the forms there." (T.r. 143, Ab. 36.) 
Mr. Anderson, Chief Architect for F.H.A., testified 
that Exhibit 3 is a copy of the document found in his file, 
which in the course of business of F.H.A. inspection is 
left upon the structure, and that at the date the slip bears 
an inspection was made, and that Exhibit 3 is the only 
slip or document which is delivered to the property owner 
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or left on the plaee, and that said exhibit is a copy of the 
inspection slip left on the respondent's premises. (A b. 
42, Tr. 172-173.) 
We respectfully submit that there is no conflict in 
the evidence that there \Yas an approval by F.H.A. Ex ... 
hi bit 1, which was the ''Compliance Inspection Report,'' 
mailed to appellant, shows nothing to the contrary. It 
contains nothing by way of exception to the uncondition-
al approval shown by Exhibit 3. The statement: ''Con-
crete to be checked for freezing after it has had more time 
to set up,'' appearing on Exhibit 1, is not an objection to 
the concrete work, and there is not a scintilla of evidence 
in the record that the concrete work was defective in any 
way, and as appears from the testimony of Mr. Swaner, 
after some fear was expressed that the cement might 
freeze, it was afterwards passed. (Tr. 113-116.) 
As a matter of fact appellant raised the question of 
the sufficiency or validity of the inspection and approval 
at the trial purely as an afterthought. That never was 
really the ground upon which it refused to advance the 
10%. The real reason is .set forth in paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 
5 and 6 of defendant's answer and counter-claim to plain-
tiff's amended comp1aint (Tr. 30-33), which defense was 
stricken as irrelevant and redundant upon motion of the 
plaintiff. (Tr. 47.) The allegations in these paragraphs 
are to the effect that appellant had contracted with re-
spondent for a similar loan covering property on Tenth 
Avenue, and that respondent had been delinquent in 
carrying out the terms of the contract with reference to 
that property, and tha.t therefore appellant "had· notified 
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plaintiff that it would not further advance on the first 
loan and' that it was no longer interested in continuiwgr 
·the second loan above described.'' 
Counsel's failure to discuss in his brief the ruling of 
the court in striking this defense indicates that he has no 
confidence in its validity. He does cover the matter by his 
Assignment of Error No. 10, but he has evidently con ... 
eluded that the assignment is without merit. 
Of course, the failure of respondent (if he did fail) to 
comply with the contract with reference to the lOth Ave-
nue property, could furnish no excuse f.or appellant's 
breach of the contract to advance money on the 16th 
East property. 
As stated in 13 Corpus Juris 613 : 
''One contract cannot be rescinded for breach of 
another and independent contract.'' 
In Rock vs. Gaede (Kan.), 207 Pac. 323, it is said: 
"The buyer has. no right to rescind or refuse to 
perform a contract for the purchase of a quantity of 
flour upon the ground that a shipment of the same 
brand, made under a separate contract between the 
same parties, had proved unfit for use.'' 
In Hanson vs. Parker-Wittenberg (Mass.), 91 N. E. 
383, it is said : 
''Where there were two independent contracts 
between the same persons for the furnishing of cer-
tain goods. of the same .kind and quality, at different 
times, the fact that the seller has committed a breach 
of the first contract, by furnishing goods inferior to 
those required by the contract, and by failing, upon 
demand, to furnish goods of the kind and quality re-
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quired, does not justify the buyer in assuming that 
the seller will also break his second contract for a 
further supply of like goods, and, although the buyer 
may be reasonably apprehensive of a like breach of 
the second contract, he has no right to rescind or 
repudiate the second contract before it has been 
broken by the seller.'' 
There was absolutely no justification for appellant's 
refusal to advance the ten per cent. Respondent had com-
plied with every condition entitling him to the payment 
of the money, and because of appellant's refusal to make 
the payment respondent eould not pay his material and 
labor bills and was obliged to cease work on the building. 
(Ab. 28, Tr. 92.) 
Now we come to the next step in the pToceedings. The 
property was covered by the mortgage, so that it was im-
possible for respondent to secure any other loan. (Ab. 
29, Tr. 98.) Respondent demanded in writing that the 
mortgage be released, and this appellant refused to do, 
unless respondent would pay the following items of ex-
pense, which it claimed to have incurred: 
Federal Housing Administration appraisal 
fee ··············-····-----------·------·-···············------·-·····-················-·················$ 10.00 
Mortgagee appraisal fee and credit report......... 6.00 
Initial service mortgagee ........ ---··················-···-··················· 75.00 
Recording fee ····-·········-······························-··················-················· 7.10 
Abstracting.......................................................................................... 5.00 
Fire Insurance ···-···-···············-····-·························-·······-·······-····· 21.00 
Total. ....................................................................... $124.10 
Less credit which appellant appears to have 
given respondent ··············-········································-·······-·· 10.00 
Net amount claim ed ..................................................................... $114.1 0 
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That appellant offered t-o release the mortgage if respond-
ent would pay the foregoing items is. set forth in para-
graph 8 of appellant's counterclaim (Tr. 33), which para-
graph, on plaintiff's motion, was stricken as constituting 
no defense (Tr. 47), and appellant assigns the ruling of 
the court as error. (Ass. Error No. 10.) 
Counsel argues that appellant was under no obliga-
tion to execute the release until these items vvrere paid, and 
especially the insurance item, which he say.s inured to the 
benefit of the property owner. Respondent was to pay 
these items in part consideration for the making of the 
loan to him, and yet appellant takes the position that, even 
th·ough appellant refused to make the loan as it agreed to 
do, respondent ought, nevertheless, to pay the expenses. 
This is an unusual brand of logic which we think the court 
will not adopt. Why is. respondent under any obligation 
to pay the expenses of securing the F.H.A. commitment, 
when, after the comnritment was obtained, appellant 
breached its. contract by refusal to pay over the money? 
The charge for insurance is no more valid than any other 
item. What use is the insurance to respondent when he 
has no house, and is prevented by the lien which appellant 
holds from securing means elsewhere with which to com-
plete the house? To say that appellant can breach its 
agreement to pay over the money, and yet require re· 
spondent to pay the expense of appellant in arranging 
for the money, seems to us preposterous. The court com-
mitted no error in striking paragraph 8 of the counter-
claim. 
10 
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We now come to a consideration of the right of re-
spondent to recover damages awarded by the judgment. 
Sec. 78-3-8 Revised Statutes of Utah 1933, provides: 
''If the mortgagee fails to discharge or release 
any mortgage after the same ha.s. been fully satisfied, 
he shall be liable to the mortgagor for double the 
damages resulting from such failure. Or the mort-
gagor may bring an action against the mortgagee to 
compel the discharge or releas.e of the mortgage after 
the same ha.s been satisfied, and the judgment of the 
court must be that the mortgagee discharge or release 
the mortgage and pay the mortgagor the costs of suit 
and all dam~ageS' resulting from su1ch faiflure. '' 
In Kelley vs. Narregang (S.D.), 162 N. W. 386, it was 
alleged in plaintiff's complaint that the plaintiff and his 
wife executed to the defendant their note for $7000, 
secured by a mortgage; that defendant caused said mort-
gage to be recorded, but defendant refused to pay over 
or deliver to the plaintiff any money, whatsoever; that 
thereafter plaintiff demanded a release of the mortgage; 
that defendant refused to cause said mortgage to be satis-
fied of record, and that plaintiff was compelled to com-
mence an action to have the same cancelled and was corp.-
pelled to employ an attorney and incurred large expense. 
It was further alleged that at the trial of the case for the 
cancellation of the mortgage the court entered judgment 
that defendant execute a satisfaction of the mortgage; 
that in prosecuting .such action plaintiff was compelled to 
incur expenses and attorney's fees amounting to the sum 
of $350. Upon demurrer to the complaint it was held 
that it stated a cause of action. 
11 
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It will be noted that the case just referred to was pros-
ecuted for the re-covery of the damages, after the can-
cellation suit had been concluded. An appeal from the 
judgment in favor of the plaintiff was prosecuted (170 
N. W. 131), and the judgment was sustained~ Says the 
court: 
''All points raised by appellant, save one, became 
_res· adjud.icata; by the judgment of the court in a 
former action brought by the present respondent 
against the present appellant, to compel the cancel-
lation of the mortgage. The only question before us 
is whether the words 'all damages. which he or they 
may sustain by reason of such refusal,' as found in 
Sec. 2061, Civil Code, include the fees paid by re-
spondent to his attorneys in the former action, and 
respondent's personal expenses in conn-ection· with 
the preparation and trial of that action.'' 
Continuing the court says: 
''By the same token it would seem that if he were 
liable for co.sts in that action, he would have be~n 
liable for the counsel fees paid by the successful 
party in that action, if claim had been made there-
for. 
In our opinion the situation is analygous. to that 
arising in actions upon undertakings given in in-
junction proceedings, where it has~ been decided that 
the injunction was improvidently granted. While in 
that action the action is ex contractu and the dam-
ages measured ·by Sec. 2295, Civil Code, and in this 
action the action is ·ex delicto and .the damage meas-
ured by Sec. 2312, Civil Code, yet, if counsel fees are 
properly allowable in the one case, they certainly 
are in the other. In each case the question is: Was 
such claimed element of damage 'proximately caused 
thereby~' " 
12 
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The court will observe that in the Kelley-Narregang 
case the facts are almost identical with those in the case 
at bar. A note and mortgage were executed and the mort-
gage recorded and no money ~vas advanced, and yet the 
court held that the statute, 'vhich is very similar to our 
Sec. 78-3-8, ap·plied. The South Dakota statute provided 
that the plaintiff might recover ''damages which he or 
they mo;y sustain by reason of such refu.sa.l," while our 
statute provides that plaintiff may recover'' all damages 
resulting from such failure.'' The only difference be-
tween the two cases is that the Kelley-Narregang case 
was one to recover the damage in a separate suit after 
the suit to compel cancellation of the mortgage had been 
decided. But on the second appeal the South Dakota 
court used this language : 
''By the same token it w·ould seem if he were 
liable for the costs in that action, he would also have 
been liable for the counsel fee.s paid by the success-
ful party in that action if a claim has been ma:d'e 
therefor.'' 
In the case of McClure vs. Scates (Kan.), 67 Pac. 856, 
the statute provided that in mandamus cases.: 
''If judgment be given for plaintiff he shall re-
cover damages which he shall have sustained, to he 
ascertained by the court or jury or by referees as in 
civil actions, and costs; and a peremptory writ of 
mandate shall also be granted to him without delay." 
The court held that ''damages" included attorney's 
fees, and that they were recoverable in the same action 
in which the writ of mandate was sought. 
13 
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Appellant relies upon the early case of Openshaw vs. 
Haflin, 24 Utah 426, 68 Pac. 138 (and we might also refer 
the court to the similar case of Brubaker vs. Bennett, 19 
Utah 401, 57 Pac. 170), wherein this court held that a 
statute which contained a .special provision for the recov-
ery of ''costs of suit, incl!uding attoTney 's fees, and all 
damages resulting .from such failure, etc.,'' was .held to 
be unconstitutional, insofa.r as it provided for the recov-
ery of attorney's fees, and appellant argues that under 
this decision attorney '.s fees cannot be recovered. This 
contention is untenable, because after these decisions were 
rendered the statute upon which we rely was amended to 
read: 
"the judgment of the court must be that the mort-
gagee discharge or release the mortgage and pay the 
mortgagor the costs of suit and all damages result-
ing from such failure. '' 
Under this statute we are entitled to recover such dam-
ages. We do not ask for the recovery of attorney's fees 
as such, which was objectionable under the old statute, 
but the attorney's fee is simply an item of damages, just 
as any other item of expenses would constitute damages. 
That attorney's fees, as an element of damages, may 
be recovered, we have only to call the court's attention to 
the case of Colorado Development Company vs. Creer, 
96 Utah 1, 80 Pac. (2) 914, wherein this court construed 
Sec. 104-68-12 Revised Statutes of Utah 1933, relating to 
actions for a writ of mandate. This statute contains the 
provision: 
14 
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''If judgment is given for app•ellant he may re-
cover the damages which he has sustained, as found 
by the jury or as may be determined by the court.'' 
This court held that under this statute attorney's fees 
incurred in an action for a writ of mandate may be re-
covered as damages, and uses this language : 
''The case of State ex rei vs. Cocking, Mayor, 66 
Mont. 169, 213 Pac. 594, and cases there cited, are 
authority for the construction of the Montana Stat-
ute, which is practically identical with Revised Stat-
utes 1933, Sec. 104-68-12, that in a mandamus pro-
ceeding the 'vord 'damages' includes the expense for 
the services of an attorney to bring the proceeding.'' 
Other cases where attorney's fees are allowed as dam-
ages in mandamus cases are : 
Columbia Knickerbocker Tr. Co. vs. Finney, 
(Kan.) 144 Pac. 222; 
Larabee Flour Mills Co. vs. Ry. Co., (Kan.) 116 
Pac. 901. 
There can be no good reason why if ''damages,'' in-
cluding attorney's fees, is an item of expense in a man-
damus proceeding, the word ''damages'' should not cover 
attorney's fees as an item of expense in a suit to cancel a 
mortgage. It is so held, not only in the Kelley-Narre-
gang case, supra, but in Cornelius vs. United States Bldg. 
& Loan Ass'n (Ida.), 292 Pac. 243; Vaught vs. Pettyjohn 
Co. (Kan.), 178 Pac. 623. 
Counsel cites authorities (among them Matheiu vs. 
Boston (S.D.), 216 N. W. 361), that a mortgagee is not 
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liable for da>mages .fo.r .refusal to release a mortgage when 
it acts in good faith and on advice of counsel. The author-
ities cited by counsel cannot aid appellant in this case. It 
~.ntered into .a definite, positive agreement to loan re-
spondent $3000, subject, of eours.e, to securing the com-
mitment frQ:rn F.H.A . .im;uring the loan. That commit-
ment was obtained. In reliance upon the arrangement he 
made with appellant, respondent proceeded with the work 
and jncurred bills for material and labor. When the work 
bad _progressed so as to require F.H.A. inspection, that 
inspection was made and the work approved. Respond-
ent a:p,plied for 10% of the loan and appellant refused to 
pay over the money. Respondent is left with a lien on 
his property, the house only .partially constructed, and 
unable to secure money elsewhere because of the cloud 
1;1pon the title. Under such circumstances, can it be said 
that there is any good faith on the part of appellant in 
;r:~fusing to keep its agreeme.nt~ It acted without the 
slightest justification and, as we have heretofore pointed 
out, its only reason for not paying the money was be-
cause it ~laimed to be dissatisfied with respondent's .con-
du.c.t with relation to the loan on the Tenth Avenue prop-
erty. 
Counsel complains of the allowance of $25.00 for dam-
ages to the building, by reason of its being left through-
out the winter in an uncompleted condition. There is 
evidence to justify far m.ore than that amount of dam-
ages, and the amount was that which was determined by 
the jury, and the court adopted the jury's finding. 
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We respectfully submit that the judgment should be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
REX J. HANSON, 
JE:SSE R. S. BUDGE, 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
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